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RECENT CASES
LIBEL AND SLANDER-BRANDING ONE A COMMUNIST OvER TELEVISION
HELD SLANDEROUS PER SE. Plaintiff alleged that in an extemporan-
eous exchange of questions and answers on a television program de-
fendant accused him of being a Communist, that plaintiff is not and
never has been a Communist, and that the defamation had injured
him and damaged him in his employment and in his profession. De-
fendant contended that the complaint should be dismissed as the al-
leged defamation was slander, not libel, and not being slanderous
per se was not actionable without proof of special damages. The court
agreed that the defamation was slander because the utterance was
extemporaneous, whereas it would be libel had it been read from
script, but held that due to the "tenor of the times" calling one a
Communist had become slanderous per se, eliminating the necessity
of alleging special damages, and found that plaintiff had been in-
jured in his employment as a public official and in his profession
as an economist. In the course of the decision the court briefly re-
viewed the history of the distinction between libel and slander and
remarked, "And so today slander is tortious if the oral defamation
falls within certain classes of cases which are actionable per se or if it
causes special damage, while libel is actionable by itself." In finding
slander rather than libel the court felt that the accompanying pic-
torial representation added no more to the defamation than if the
audience had heard the spoken words in a stadium. Remington v.
Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S. D. N. Y. 1949). This case bears witness
to a growing trend toward considering it defamatory per se to call
one a Communist. No doubt this trend is due to the increased odium
and stigma attached to Communism by an overwhelming majority
of our public. Thus there has been a gradual, but accelerated depart-
ure from the attitude of courts to regard a charge of Communism as
no worse than calling an Alabaman a Republican.'
Even more important, the court injected the traditional distinction
between libel and slander into the newest medium of communication.
The field of defamation is composed of the so-called twin torts of
libel and slander. Historically, slander came first and occupied the
whole field, since the spoken word was virtually the only common
means of communication. Originally under the jurisdicition of the
local seigniorial courts, then the ecclesiastical, it came to rest in
the common law courts where the deluge of cases forced the judges
to surround the remedy with restrictions.' These restrictions are
largely responsible for the absurdities, and anachronisms that today
1 Accord, Grant v. Reader's Digest Association, 151 F. 2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945);
Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y. S. 2d 148 (1941) (libel including
"Nazi" opprobrium also). See Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1947)
(attacking one's patriotism is libelous per se). Contra: Krumholz v. Raffler, 195
Misc. 789, 91 N.Y. S. 2d 743 (1949) (a case completely ignored by the court
in the principal case).
Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20 N.Y. S. 2d 544 (1940).
Prosser, Torts 778 (1941).
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plague those who litigate in the field of defamation.! Libel, on the
other hand, came to the common law by way of the Star Chamber
where, due to its Roman heritage, it was both a crime and a tort.
Both of these torts perform the same office of bringing the victim
into contempt, ridicule, disrepute, hatred, obloquy, or otherwise
tend to damage his livelihood, the only difference being in the meth-
od of presentation.
Necessarily, the original distinction was between the spoken and
the written word, and to the present day many courts continue to
make this now baseless distinction.' The spoken word was fleeting,
and in centuries past had a highly restricted area of dissemination,
while libel was capable of wider publication and more damaging be-
cause of its permanence of form. The modern inventions of public
address systems, telegraph, telephone, phonograph, moving and talk-
ing pictures, recording machines, radio, and television have rendered
even more obsolete the distinction which was considered baseless in
1812,' although too well established even then to be eradicated. Thus,
the rule without the reason is the troublesome heritage of the present.
Clearly the advent of modern facilities has rendered the spoken
word at least as harmful as the written. Moreover, it has increased
the uncertainty in a field of law notorious for its welter of confusion.
Because of the mechanics involved, radio contains elements of both
libel and slander. This had led to a divergence of opinion by decision'
and statute.' The court in the present case applied the law, peculiar to
New York, that it is libel if read from script, but slander if extempor-
aneous.' Such fioldings only serve to perpetuate and increase the con-
fusion and broaden the increasingly uncertain division between these
two torts. The listener does not know whether the defamation was
spontaneous or from script, and to the victim it is of monumental
indifference. The liability of the defamer should be the same in
either case. A collateral issue involved is the liability of the station
or network. It would seem to be infinitely more desirable to decide
4 Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of Slander and Libel, 36 Am. L. Rev. 552
(1902); Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 Minn. L. Rev.
609 (1949); Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 Col. L.
Rev. 33 (1904).
5 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. Supp. 188, 192 (1937) ("Libel
has always been considered as written, and slander as spoken defamation"); Rei-
man v. Pacific Development Company, i32 Ore. 82, 284 Pac. 575 (1930) (action
for libel must be predicated on written words, which include any printed, painted,
or other n,,transient method of conveying thought, while action of slander dis-
penses with necessity for writing).
4 Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 255, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812).
7 That it is libel, Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932),
aff'd per cuiam 290 U. S. 599 (1933); Hartmann v. Winchell, 187 Misc. 54, 63 N. Y.
S.2d 225 (1946). That it is slander, Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299
N. Y. Supp. 188 (1937).
8 That it is libel, Ill. Ann. Stats. C. 38 J§ 404.1-404.4 (1945); Wash. Rev. Stats.
Ann. H§ 2424, 2427 (Supp. 1940). That it is slander, Cal. Civ. Code 1 46 (Deering
1949); Cal. Pen. Code § 258 (Deering 1949); N. D. Rev. Code § 12-2815 (1943).
9 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N. Y. Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd
253 App.Div. 887. (1938).
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this point by weighing the desirability of absolute liability against
the public interest in freedom of speech than to base it on an anti-
quated and now absurd distinction between two different torts which
have, in effect, indistinguishably coalesced in many modern forms of
communication as many cases have decided."
The misapplication of the libel and slander remedies can be
traced to a large extent to the lack of knowledge of the history and
development of the twin torts. To be actionable at common law,
slander either had to fall within certain arbitrary and apparently
exhaustive categories u which were denominated slanderous per se,
or else there had to be allegations and proof of special damages. If
the defamatory nature of the utterance was not apparent on its face,
innuendo was required to unmask the concealed meaning of the
words.12 Conversely, libel was actionable per se whether the words
were libelous per se or per quod.' Per quod simply meant that in-
nuendo was required where the words were covert. The single office
of innuendo is to clarify the meaning of otherwise ambiguous words.
Yet a modern American innovation, blindly and widely followed, has
given it the effect of deciding whether a libel per quod is actionable
without allegation and proof of special damages. This is done by re-
quiring such allegation and proof unless the alleged defamation is
libelous per se.'" Hence, libel has been made to occupy the same posi-
10 In Summit Hotel Company v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.
2d 302 (1939). The court refused to hold the broadcasting company liable for ex-
temporaneous defamation not in script and which it was unable to anticipate or pre-
vent from being broadcast. The court further rejected analogy between newspapers
and radio, and rejected absolute liability for broadcasters, suggesting that radio
can be controlled adequately through the Federal Radio Commission. Further, that
the distinction 'between libel and slander is not applicable to radio broadcasting.
Most courts have held the broadcasting station or network absolutely liable. Soren-
son v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932); Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting
Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W. D. Mo. 1934); See 29 Neb. L. Rev. 133 (1950). Statutory
limitations on publisher's liability have been struck down as unconstitutional. In
Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 206 P.2d 952 (Cal. 1949)
a statute limiting the liability of radio stations and newspapers was so treated as
being discriminatory. In Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Company, 45 N. D. 568, 178 N. W.
792 (1920) a retraction statute was held constitutional only by an interpretation
that it did not deny actual damages.
'A Words imputing tihe commission of an indictable offense involving moral tur-
pitude or opprobrious punishment; words imputing a contagious disease which would
cause the person having it to be excluded from society; words conveying a charge
of unfitness, dishonesty, or Incompetence in an office of profit, profession or trade,
in short, those which would impair his livelihood. In almost all jurisdictions, by sta-
tute, attacking a woman's chastity is also defamatory per se.
0 Hendrix v. Mobile Register, 202 Ala. 616, 81 So. 558 (1919).
2 Prosser, Torts 797 (1941). "The existence of damage was conclusively as-
sumed from the publication of the libel itself... This is the accepted rule in
England and in the great majority of the American jurisdiction, not only as to
publications which defamatory upon their face, but also as to those which require
resort to extrinsic facts by way of 'inducement' to establish the defamatory mean-
ing." The author refuses to use "per se" and "per quod" in his text because of their
indiscriminate use by the courts as to whether they apply to the question as to
whether the alleged defamation is defamatory or not upon its face, or whether special
damages are requisite to actionability.
'4 Woolston v. Montana Free Press, 90 Mont. 299, 2 P.2d 1020 (1931).
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tion in the present that slander held in the past, and "actionable per
se" and libel "per se" have often been tortured into being synonyms.
This departure from the common law, without aid of statute, would
seem to be a result of inadvertence rather than a deliberate realign-
ment of the different forms of defamation. This seems unjustifiable,
as a libel per quod, by its very nature, indicates at least as much de-
liberation and malice as a libel per se. At common law, damages
were presumed where there was a libel, whether it was per se or per
quod and actionability followed as a matter of course." Furnishing
a glaring example of a particularly distinctive offense is a leading
North Dakota case" on defamation, which not only held that a "libel"
must be libelous per se to be actionable per se, but used "libel" and
"slander" interchangeably as though they were synonymous and de-
cided a libel case by slander rules.
The amazing inertia of the judiciary in regard to bringing some
order and reason into the field of defamation make it readily appar-
ent that the only cure is by legislation. The American Law Institute,
in the Restatement of Torts, gingerly avoided taking a concrete
stand in this, the most chaotic field of law as evidenced by its fail-
ure to do for defamation what it did for so many fields of law.
Canada, however, met this problem squarely with the Canadian De-
famation Act in 1944, prepared by the Canadian Conference of
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation, and adopted by two
provinces." The Act makes all defamations actionable without alle-
gation and proof of damage. Respected authorities and able writers"
in this country have vociferously attacked the status quo of the
law here, and four proposals have materialized as a solution as to
what direction the law should take, assuming that the distinction
should be abandoned between libel and slander. First, to merge libel
into slander and require proof of actual damage in all cases as es-
sential to the existence of a cause of action. Newspapers and broad-
casting companies favor this plan for obvious reasons. Second, make
all defamations actionable without proof of damage. This is subject
to the objection that much hasty language is trivial and harmless, and
that opportunities for extortion are increased. However, the Canadian
law that is practically equivalent to this has met with no serious dif-
ficulties, and Louisiana, where the same rule is in effect as to both
civil" and criminal" libel, has had no more than the usual number
13 Prossax, Torts 797 (1941).
- Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400
(1936). But cf. Ingalls v. Hastings and Sons Pub. Co., 304 Mass. 31, 22 N. E.
2d 657 (1939) (demurrer to libel declaration cannot be sustained, nor the case
withdrawn from jury unless the words are incapable of a defamatory meaning).
'T Alta. c. 14 J§ 2, 3 (1947); Man. c. 11 J§ 2, 3 (1946).
- Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of Slander and Libel, 86 Am. L. Rev. 552
(1902); Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 Minn. L. Rev.
609 (1949); Green, Relational Interests, 31 Ill. L. Rev. 85 (1936); Veeder, The His-
tory and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 Col. L. Rev. 33 (1904).
19 Spotorno v. Fourichon, 40 La. Ann. 907, 4 So. 71 (1888).
2e La. Code Crim. Law & Proc. Ann. §1 740-47 (1943).
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of cases. The third proposal is to distinguish defamations purely on
the basis of whether they are major or minor, requiring proof of
damage where they are minor. Whether the distinction advocated
here would be any betier than the distinction between libel and
slander is doubtful. The fourth is to distinguish on the basis of the
extent of publication.
The most logical step would be to merge libel and slander into a
single body of defamatory law, consequently more uniform, based
on more sound reason, far less subject to misinterpretation, and yet
flexible so that it can adapt itself to future developments.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTrruTIONAL LAw-ZoNING ORDIN-
ANCE PROHIBITING AN EXISTING USE. The plaintiff sued the City of
Tallahassee to enjoin enforcement of a city zoning ordinance passed
in 1948 requiring the company to discontinue the operation of a gaso-
line service station located directly across from the entrance to the
capitol building. In 1936 a comprehensive zoning plan included P's
area within a residential district and forbade such a use of the pro-
perty. Later that year the area was re-zoned to allow gasoline sta-
tions. During this time P bought the land and made valuable im-
provements. In 1939 the district was again zoned and gasoline sta-
tions were served with ten years notice to liquidate and move out.
The ordinance complained of here did not accelerate the move but
changed the district to residential again. The U. S. District Court
held that the ordinance was valid and enforceable and dissolved the
temporary restraining order. On appeal it was held, with one dissent,
that the ordinance was justified as a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the city as a matter of legislative discretion and was not un-
constitutional by way of being an arbitrary interference with vested
rights or unreasonable as having no relation to the general welfare.
Standard Oil Company vs. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (1950).
The courts are tending to recognize the power of the municipality
to force discontinuance of existing uses which although not nuisances
themselves are discimmoding to the district,' but there is such au-
thority clinging to the older traditions.' This type of zoning ordinance
has been upheld under the police power if it meets the requirements
that it is the result of a proper enabling statute' and is passed pur-
suant to a comprehensive and reasonable zoning plan seeking the
best possible zoning for the general public benefit.' If the existing
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. 8. 365, 887 (1926) (first in-
portant zoning case to reach the Supreme Court); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 289 U. S.
894 (1915); Duficon Concrete Products Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N J. 509,
64 A.2d 347 (1949); 8 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 1 25, 183 (Sd ed. 1950).
2 Womens Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, 58 F. 2d 593 (8th
Cir. 1932); Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green 244 Ky. 362, 50 S.W.2d 960
(1932); People v. Stanton, 125 Misc. 215, 211 N.Y. Supp. 438 (1925).
8 State ex rel. Taylor v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 183 So. 114 (1931); cf.
Bismarck v. Hughes, 53 N. D. 838, 208 N.W. 711 (1926).
4 Geneva Inv. Co. v. St. Louis, 87 F. 2d 83 (8th Cir. 1937); Standard Oil Co.
v. Bowling Green, supra note 2.
